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NOTES
ant obviously could not overcome the effects of that procedural device.
Only a few areas of the law, such as workman's compensation, have
been settled by legislation.
The basic problem of the law is twofold: determining the proper
incidence of an economic burden and formulating the role of the courts
and the legislature in accomplishing the desired results. As long as ob-
jectives are being attained under varied and contradictory legal theories,
results may not be consistent. If public policy demands that those pur-
suing an activity be absolutely liable, the legislature should act accord-
ingly. If negligence should be the basis of recovery, the courts should
not adopt res ipsa loquitur and other devices which in effect impose
an absolute liability."0 A settled theory is necessary in order that the
various classes of litigants involved in future cases may take adequate
safeguards by insurance and cost calculation."' If the activity is one
particularly adaptable to enterprise liability, the actor should prepare him-
self to withstand liability when the risks of his activity mature.
HOW STATES SHOULD RESOLVE CONFLICTS PROBLEMS
UNDER THE DIRECT ACTION STATUTE-AN APPROACH
Recent insurance legislation has given rise to many interesting con-
flict of laws questions. Since their resolution by the courts will ma-
terially affect the rights of the injured party, the insured, and the insurer,
a critical analysis of these questions seems in order.
To balance more equally the interests of insurance companies, in-
jured and insured parties,' states have nullified the "no action" clause 2
which changes the essential nature of the insurance contract from lia-
70. Failure of the courts to establish a definite standard for liability in the food
products cases has been criticized. "In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the in-
ference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule
approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the
basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If public
policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality regardless
of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly." Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion).
71. "The entire field of liability is in a phase of adjustment. There is, on the part
of the public, an increasing dissatisfaction for the way liability claims are handled.
Insurance companies are not satisfied either. Verdicts are unpredictable. The guiding
principles of liability are insufficiently clear and a satisfactory distribution of the loss
foreseeable is practically an impossible task." Niccolini, Liability Without Negligence,
1954 INs. L. J. 527, 554 (1954).
1. It has been contended that in liability insurance, the needs of only two basic
groups must be satisfied-the claimant who seeks compensation for his loss and the
policyholder who needs protection against financial hardship or ruin. Smithsom, A
Philosophy of Liability Insurance, 1953 INs. L.J. 663.
2. For discussion of trends of modern legislation to circumvent this "no action"
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bility to indemnity and bars actions against insurers until a loss is actually
sustained by the insured.' The usual enactment requires that insurance
contracts contain a provision excluding insolvency or bankruptcy of the
insured as grounds for exempting the company from liability ;4 in addi-
tion, these statutes commonly provide for suit against the insurer on an
unpaid judgment against the tortfeasor.5 A second type statute, enacted
only in Louisiana and Wisconsin, permits a direct action against the
insurer, thus avoiding the necessity of first establishing the insured's
liability by a previous judgment.6
The Louisiana type of statute, in addition to avoiding the "no ac-
tion" clause, extends many advantages to the injured party.7 With the
insurance company as a defendant in the suit, the likelihood of a plain-
provision, see Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Indemnity, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 189,
228-31 (1931). The author includes: 1) indemnity bonds for motor carriers; 2) bank-
ruptcy and insolvency statutes; 3) rights of action on policy for injured victim;
4) agreements to cancel policy forbidden. For comparison of methods utilized by the
courts to nullify the "no action" clause, see Note, 9 ORE. L. REV. 57 (1929).
3. In the absence of a "no action" clause, the policy is considered to be insurance
against the tortfeasor's liability. When the insured's liability is established by a judg-
ment, his insurer is rendered liable for this amount. 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW § 1165 (1929). In essence, these clauses negate any action against the
company unless it is brought by the insured to reimburse himself for a loss actually
sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment in favor of the injured party.
The insolvency of the insured is a complete defense to the insurer since loss by the
insured is precluded. 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 169 (5th ed. 1952). See Note, 25
COLUm.. L. REV. 661, 661-62 (1925).
4. 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 170 (5th ed. 1952). For representative statutes, see
CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 11580 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-508 (1952); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 167(1) (a), (b).
For a survey of liability insurance statutes enacted in various states, see Notes, 15
IOWA L. REV. 73 (1929), 9 ORE. L. REV. 57 (1929); Legis. Note, 46 HARV. L. REV.
1325 (1932).
5. Ibid., but for examples of differences in statutory language, see ALA. CODE tit.
28, § 11 (1941) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 379.195 (1952). These statutes in essence provide
that the liability of the insurance company shall become absolute whenever a loss occurs,
and the payment of such loss is not dependent on the satisfaction by the assured of a
final judgment against him.
6. LA. STAT. §§ 655, 983E (1951) ; WXis. STAT. § 261.11, § 85.93 (1953). The
Wisconsin statute applies only to the operation of a motor vehicle, whereas the Louisi-
ana statute applies to accidents in general. The Louisiana statute is comprehensively
discussed in Comment, 13 LA. L. REV. 495 (1953) ; Note, 39 VA. L. REV. 655 (1953). Also
see Note, 25 TUL. L. REV. 290 (1951). For a comparison of the aspects of this statute
with legislation enacted in New York and Massachusetts, see Comment, 11 TUL. L. REv.
443 (1937). It is interesting to note that a statute comparable to that enacted in
Louisiana was proposed in the Indiana legislature during the 1955 session as S. 313.
The Wisconsin statute is discussed in Notes, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 110 (1934), 1951
Wis. L. REV. 567.
7. The judiciary indicates, however, that the intention for the passage of the law
was to equal the legislative scheme of those states which allowed joinder of insurance
companies only after judgment was rendered. See Elbert v. Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Co., 202 F.2d 744, 746 (1953).
NOTES
tiff securing a favorable verdict on less evidence is enhanced;s and since
juries often feel that a large company can better afford to make sizeable
payments, damages awarded against insurance companies are usually
substantial.' It is often asserted that the actual presence of the insur-
ance company in the case will make little difference in the outcome,"
since insurance companies are involved in a large percentage of liability
cases," and since the insurer's interest in the suit is often evidenced
through the voir dire examination or through the production of evi-
dence during the trial.' Nevertheless, many states make a conscientious
effort to limit disclosure of this information." The conspicuous absence
of direct action statutes also suggests that states may fear prejudicing
the insurer.'"
Because of a desire to preserve domestic tranquility, the majority of
states deny interspousal suits.'" Under the direct action statute in
Louisiana, such suits are now permissible on the theory that the insur-
ance company is the real defendant.'
8. See Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 22
MARQ. L. REV. 75, 81 (1938) ; Sedgwick, Accident Litigation: The Insurance Carrier
Defends, 287 ANNALS 75 (1953). See Miller v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 50 R.I.
166, 170, 146 Atl. 412, 414 (1930).
9. Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J. 411, 415; Marshall,
Direct Action Against the Liability Insurer Under the Riles of Civil Procedure, 22
DICTA 314, 315 (1954); Note, 6 So. CAR. L.Q. 461, 462 (1954); see, e.g., Berstein v.
Popkin, 202 Wis. 624, 633, 233 N.W. 572, 575 (1930).
10. Generally, see 1 WIaIORE, EVIDENCE § 2 82a (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE § 168 (1954).
11. The fact that jurors assume that the defendant is insured is recognized in the
cases. See Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Connelly v. Nolte, 237
Iowa 114, 132, 21 N.W.2d 311, 320 (1946).
12. See Notes, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 110, 112 (1934), 3 Wyo. L.J. 82 (1948). It has
been contended that informing jurors by innuendo through the voir dire examination
is insufficient. Andrews, The Insurer as the Real Party in Interest, 29 DICTA 145
(1952).
13. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 761-92 (1949).
14. This information is primarily restricted by requiring good faith in questions
on the voir dire examination. See Annot., 95 A.L.R. 388, 404-09 (1935). Also see
Rieschmann v. Reasner, 221 Ind. 628, 51 N.E.2d 10 (1943) ; Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah
179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932); Marmon Motor Car Co. v. Schafer, 93 Ind. App. 588, 178
N.E. 863 (1931).
15. Note, 28 ILL. L. R v. 688, 696 (1934).
16. Farage, Recovery for Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. L.J. 290 (1935). See
PROSSER, TORTS § 99 (1941). The generalization applies to personal torts, but has not ap-
plied for injuries to the personality of husbands and wives. See also McCurdy, Torts Be:
tween Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1081 (1930).
17. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935), noted in
10 TUL. L. REv. 312 (1936). But the principle has not been extended to suits between
children and parents. See Ruiz v. Clancy, 157 So. 737 (La. App. 1934). See Note, 14
TUL. L. REV. 468 (1940).
A direct action statute does not necessarily require a state to permit such actions.
In Wisconsin, it has been reasoned that the insurer does not assume liability where
there is no such liability, and none exists when a cause of action is disallowed. See
Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 233, 16 N.W.2d
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Opportunities to use the federal courts of the state of the injured
party are maximized under the direct action statute since the diversity of
citizenship requirement will be satisfied by the participation of an in-
surance company from another state.IS Furthermore, service of process
is facilitated by the presence of the insurer's special agent in the state for
such service.19 Since there need be only one trial, circuitous litigation is
eliminated, thereby reducing trial costs and permitting satisfaction of
claims at minimum expense."
While it ostensibly favors the injured party, presence of an insurer
has been argued as benefiting the company on the theory that a jury
acquainted with the limits of the policy will render a verdict more in
accord with it and the insurance attorney may point out the dangers of
taking advantage of the company. 1 Such reasoning has apparently
failed to convince the insurers who have made concerted efforts to avoid
participation in lawsuits.22 The efforts are not without reason.
Prejudice of the jury toward insurance companies may stimulate
the interpretation of evidence and prevent an impartial decision. 2  In
addition, defenses available to the insurer, pertaining to the enforceability
of the insurance contract and its validity, are presented to the jury along
with such issues as negligence and contributory negligence.2 The burden
on the jury in deciding these multiple and complex issues may result in
confusion and an improper determination of the case. 2' The insurance
company may be further handicapped by the waning interest of the in-
sured in the outcome of the litigation.20
787, 789 (1944). Liability insurance in general does not change the rule denying
remedies to either spouse. See PROSSER, TORTS § 99 (1941). For discussion, see Note,
10 TUL. L. REv. 312 (1936).
18. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 23 U.S.L. Week 4050 (U.S. Dec.
6, 1954).
19. 2 CoucH, op. cit. szpra note 3, § 553 (1929). For representative statutes with
this requirement, see CAL. INS. CODE § 1600 (1950) ; GA. CODE AN. § 603 (1953).
20. See Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465, 471 n.11
(W.D. La. 1952). Note, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 110, 115-16 (1934).
21. Lassiter, supra note 9, at 415-16; Note, 20 CORXELL L.Q. 110, 112 (1934).
22. A prime example of this is the insurer's use of the loan receipt, which enables
the insurer to hide behind the insured when subrogated to his rights, thereby avoiding
possible jury prejudice. See 2 RIcHARDS, INSURANCE § 202 (5th ed. 1952) ; see also
Note, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 279 (1946).
23. Appleman, supra note 8, at 81.
24. See 1 RICHARDS, op. cit. supra note 3, § 172 for discussion of these defenses,
which include: misrepresentation; breach of warranty of insured; fraud or collusion
between injured and insured; injured not in a class protected by the policy; period of
limitations in policy bars action by the injured person. See Note, 21 B.U.L. REv. 749
(1941).
25. Appleman, supra note 8 at 82.
26. See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Watson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp., 23 U.S.L. Week 4045, 4048 n.1 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1954).
NOTES
Insurance companies charge premiums in accord with formulae
which consider losses and expenses; therefore, the awarding of higher
verdicts tends to increase premium rates for policyholders.2" The threat
of excessive verdicts also has an inflationary effect on settlements; this
too contributes to higher premiums.- Higher rates might cause the
policyholder to carry -less insurance or even discourage the purchase of
insurance.2" While an excessive verdict may be to an injured party's
benefit in a particular case, it would seem that low rates of insurance,
making it available to more potential tortfeasors, would be to the ad-
vantage of injured parties as a class."0
The consequences of a direct action statute are substantial in contrast
to other methods of reaching the assets of insurance companies and
reflect a definite internal policy of the state in the regulation of accidents
and insurance. But application of this statute will not always be limited
to internal affairs since accidents and insurance have an interstate
character. The automobile in particular has diminished the importance
of state -boundaries. A great percentage of cases involving the direct
action statute concern automobile accident litigation. Hence clash of
multi-state interests is frequently involved and must be resolved by con-
flict of laws rules. 31
These rules seek to obtain uniformity in adjudicating disputes.12
While they must be applied to a variety of situations, the most trouble-
some involve a multiplicity of factual contacts, coupled with differences
27. Appleman, supra note 8, at 81. See Note, 28 ILL. L. REv. 688, 696 (1934).
28. Note, 28 ILL. L. REv. 688, 697 (1934).
29. One author maintains that if rates continue to increase substantially, as they
have in the past, there is danger that private auto insurance will be priced out of the
market or the private insurance industry will not be able to provide an adequate market
to supply the demand for automobile insurance. This will inevitably lead to socialized
insurance. Sedgwick, supra note 8, at 75.
30. The comparative advantages of these two possibilities must be weighed by the
public as one determination of the desirability of the direct action statute. See LASSITER,
supra note 9, at 416.
31. See Page, Conflict of Law Problems in Automobile Accidents, 1943 Wis. L.
REV. 145. The increasing number of highway accidents is a serious problem of society.
See Marryott, Automobile Accidents and Financial Responsibility, 287 ANNALS 83(1953). For brief expressions of the general problems in conflict of laws caused by
statutory efforts to join insurance companies in accident litigation, see HANCOCl, TORTS
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 52 (1942) ; 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A CO.MPAR-
ATIVE STUDY 263-65 (1947); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 211 (2d ed. 1951).
32. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (3d ed. 1949) ; 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra note
38, at 87-88; Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L. REV. 156,
164 (1930); Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws,
43 YALE 1082, 1108 (1934). Uniformity is not, however, an exlusive goal. For example,
see GRAVESON, THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS 6-8 (2d ed. 1952) who emphasizes goals of con-
venience and comity in supplementing the striving for justice. See also Neumer, Policy
Considerations in the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAN. B. REv. 479, 482-86 (1942).
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between the laws of the states." The conflict of laws rules usually de-
termine how much each state's statutes will control the decision. 4 When
a statute contains stipulated limitations, indicating the extent of its
applicability, the conflicts rules are not applied.3" In determining the
scope of the statute, at times a court will examine the fundamental policy
of the act; this is frequently indicated by the type- of statute enacted or
the particular phraseology employed. 6 Generally, statutes are not drafted
in terms of multi-state problems,3 7 and the courts must then resort to the
33. See Hancock, Choice of Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases, 5 U. TORONTO
L.J. 133, 134 (1943) ; Heilman, supra note 32, at 1108.
34. 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 31, at 95; ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 118 (1940) ; Morris, The Choice of Law Clause in Statutes, 62 L.Q.
REV. 170 (1946). But see FALCONBRIDME, CONFLICT OF LAWS 21-23 (2d ed. 1954) who
deliberately omits this as a purpose of conflicts rules. Also see Schreiber, The Doctrine
of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 523, 529-31 (1918) who
argues that conflict rules are not supposed to define the limits of spatial operation of
the internal rules of states; the function of these rules is not definitive, but selective.
35. For example, the conflict of laws rules may direct the court to an insurance
statute of the foreign state. However, if the language of this statute limits its applica-
tion to interests situated within the state, then it cannot be used to govern any other
interests. See NuSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-73 (1943).
See also Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUTM. L. REV. 959,
965-69 (1952).
36. See HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 23, § 14; NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 35,
at 72; McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 78
U. PA. L. REV. 933, 941 (1930) ; Morris, supra note 34, at 170.
Assuming of course that the forum is desirous of ascertaining the purpose of the
statute in question, it may consider the particular type. Thus, since Wisconsin enacted a
direct action statute, but limited it to motor vehicle accidents, this expresses a different
policy toward insurance and accidents than does the typical Nebraska statute which
gives an action against the insurer only after a judgment against the insured.
Statutes accomplishing functions similar to the direct action have used varying lan-
guage to convey their intentions. For example, some are written in terms of "every
policy written . . ." R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 155, § 1 (1938). Others provide that "no
policy . . . shall be issued or delivered in this state .. " LA. REV. STAT. § 655 (1950).
"Any bond or policy of insurance" is included in some statutes. WIS. STAT. § 85.93
(1953). Still other states regulate "[iln respect to every contract of insurance made
between an insurance company and any person . . ."1 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 11 (1941).
Another state asserts that contracts must have certain provisions in this state. CAL. INS.
CODE AN N. § 11580 (1950). From this diversity of language, perhaps different inten-
tions of the statute may be found. For example, statutory language referring to all con-
tracts embraces more than statutes limited to policies in the state. Also, differences in
interpreting the use of the words "issued" and "made" may be perceived.
Some aid in construing the intention of the statute as communicated by these vari-
ous phrases is derived from other sources. Thus, in New York there is a general regu-
latotry policy designed to regulate all types of insurance and insurance companies "doing
an insurance business" in the state. This at least indicates the all inclusiveness of the
purpose of supplementary insurance regulations. N.Y. INS. LAW § 40 (1949).
Additional relief in construing vague phraseology is afforded by the enacting state
by defining certain terms of the statute. Thus, "[alll contracts of insurance, the appli-
cation for which is taken within the state, shall be deemed to have been made within
this state, subject to the laws thereof." ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 10 (1940).
37. The major exception to this generalization is in the field of workmen's com-
pensation. See Roos, The Problem of Workmen's Compensation in Air Transportation,
6 J. AIR L. REV. 1 (1935).
NOTES
conflicts rules, the use of which must be justified practically in terms
of desirability of results reached.
In order to reach these results, problems involving direct action
statutes must be characterized. 8  The initial stage is to allot the facts
to a legal category, which determines the nature of the problem. 9 While
actions arising out of liability insurance contracts present aspects of tort
and contract, 0 only one category can be selected. States have disagreed,
but the contract classification has usually prevailed.4 In the second
stage, the state whose local or internal law should be applied must be
designated.4 2  This has generally been the place of making the con-
tract.4" However, states have also applied the law of the jurisdiction
For general discussion of the process and goals of drafting laws in the light of
potential conflicts problems, see Morris, supra note 34; see also McClintock, supra note
36, at 941.
38. Characterization is sometimes used synonomously with "qualification" and
"classification."
For general discussions and analysis of characterization, see COOK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASIS OF CONFLICT OF LAws 211-38 (1942) ; 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 31,
at 47-60; ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 1. Robertson's study is the most compre-
hensive. Also see Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary
Questions in the Conflict of Laws, 14 So. CALIF. L. REv. 221 (1941) ; Falconbridge,
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 L.Q. REv. 235, 537 (1937) ; Lorenzen, The
Theory of Qualification and the Conflict of Laws, 20 COLUm. L. REv. 247 (1920).
39. This stage is referred to frequently as "primary characterization" and its func-
tion is to put a legal complexion upon the facts. This stage of the process has to be
performed in every legal determination, whether involving a problem of conflict of laws
or not. Generally, see ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 59-91; Cormak, supra note
38, at 223-33; FALCONBRIDGE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 123.
40. Hancock, op. cit. supra note 31, at 240-41.
41. See general discussion in Notes, 3 UTAH L. REv. 490, 493-99 (1953), 39 VA.
L. REv. 655, 663-68 (1953).
Most cases in this area automatically refer to the contract. See Fischer v. Home
Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952); Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507,
41 N.W.2d 611 (1950); Riding v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 48 R.I. 433, 138 Atl. 186
(1927).
In Kerston v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932) an injury occurred in
Wisconsin, which applied its direct action statute. Although the opinion doesn't indicate
the place of contracting, it has been argued that this case gives a basis for suggesting
that the place of injury should determine the obligation of the tortfeasor's insurer. See
HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31, § 52; accord, Hidalog v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
N.Y., 104 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. La. 1952); Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss.
423, 181 So. 316 (1938).
42. This stage is referred to as the "connecting factor" because its function is to
establish a connection between the factual situation in dispute and a particular system
of law. Generally, see ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 92-117; Cormak, supra note
38, 234-40; Falconbridge, supra note 34, at 124-36.
43. The cases have interpreted "place of making" to mean where the last act neces-
sary to make a valid contract was completed. Delivery of the policy or execution of it
has constituted this final act. See Fischer v. Home Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th
Cir. 1952) ; Belanger v. Great American Indemnity Co. of N.Y., 188 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.
1951) ; Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950) ; Coderre v. Trav-
elers' Ins. Co., 48 R.I. 152, 136 AtI. 205 (1927). See Note, 3 UTAH L. REv. 490, 494
(1953). For a general criticism of the "place of contracting" rule, see Cook, 'Contracts'
and the Conflict of Laws, 31 ILL. L. REv. 143 (1936).
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explicitly stipulated in the contract,44 the place intended by the parties,"3
or the place of performance." If the problem is classified as tort, the
law of the place of accident controls." In the final stage, the forum
must determine whether the direct action statute is one of substance or
procedure ;4 if it is considered to be procedural, the forum will apply its
own law.49  Once again, the states have conflicted." Some have called
the statute procedural;"1 others have labeled it substantive. 2  This con-
fusion is compounded by the difficulty of perceiving differences be-
tween substance and procedure. 3
Another complicating factor in the characterization process is the
determination of which state's law to apply in deciding each of the three
44. Duncan v. Ashwander, 16 F. Supp. 829 (D.C. La. 1936) ; accord, Sheehan v.
Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 260 N.W. 633 (1935). For general discussion of the right to stip-
ulate the law of a state to govern a contract, see 1 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 199;
Annot., 112 A.L.R. 124 (1938). In some instances, the courts have disregarded express
contract stipulations in determining the place of contract. See Cravens v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 178 U.S. 389 (1900).
45. Actually, there is only a slight suggestion in some cases that intent has an
influence. See Bayard v. Traders & General Insurance Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D.
La. 1941).
46. Martin v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 84 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1936), vacating, 13 F. Supp. 162 (D. R.I. 1935), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 579 (1936). Here
the place of performance governed because of an explicit stipulation in the contract.
Generally, however, place of performance has been rejected by the courts, although it
has been argued in the cases. See dissenting opinion in Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, 256 Wis.
507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950) ; Lowery v. Zorn, 157 So. 826 (La. App. 1934).
47. See Hidalog v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 104 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. La. 1952)
Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938) ; Kerston v. Johnson,
185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932).
48. This stage is called secondary characterization, and is necessary to determine
how much of the foreign and domestic law appiles to the case. In addition to substance
and procedure determinations, questions of domicile and capacity, etc., when revelant,
are decided at this stage. See ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 118-34.
49. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 32, § 80; HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31, § 13.
50. See Notes, 3 UTAH L. REV. 490, 490-93 (1953); 39 VA. L. REv. 655, 657-63
(1953).
51. Louisiana has generally labeled the statute as procedural. See Churchman v.
Ingram, 56 So.2d 297 (La. App. 1951) ; Robbins v. Short, 165 So. 512 (La. App. 1936) ;
Stephenson v. List Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 182 La. 383, 162 So. 19 (1935) ; but
cf. West v. Monroe Bakery, Inc., 217 La. 189, 46 So.2d 122 (1950).
52. Wisconsin has refused to invoke the direct action statute because substantial
rights were involved. See Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950) ;
Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936). In the federal courts of Louisiana,
although at one time conflicting, the statute is now labeled substantive. See Bayard v.
Traders & General Ins. Co., 99 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1951).
53. Cook argues that the distinction between substance and procedure is but an
imperceptible degree. CooK, op. cit. supra note 38, at 154-93. For general discussion of
substance and procedure, see GODORICH, op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 80-91; FALCON.RIDGE,
op. cit. supra note 34, at 301-15. Ailes, Substance and procedure in. the Conflict oJ
Laws, 39 MIcH L. REv. 392 (1941) should be compared with Cook's analysis. See also
McClintock, supra note 36; Note, 47 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1933).
NOTES
previous stages. 4  Thus, a state may make these determinations under
its own internal or conflicts laws, or under the internal or conflicts laws
of the foreign state.5" Generally, characterization is governed by the
internal law of the forum, 6 but there is some dispute. 7 The great in-
consistency throughout the entire process of characterization indicates
the possibility of adjusting and juggling the rules in order to fit the cir-
cumstances of the particular situation."8
While at times the Supreme Court has indicated a desire to weigh
conflicting regulatory policies, it has offered no relief in respect to
direct action statutes."5 There is no national legislative policy, such as
that expressed in the anti-trust field, to guide the Court.65 It is doubtful
whether any formula can be conceived which would adequately balance,
.or decide between, the states' varying policies in compensating injured
parties, controlling accidents, and regulating insurance companies."'
54. Robertson discusses these possibilities within each chapter devoted to the par-
ticular stage. Thus, see ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 66-91- (primary character-
ization), 95-117 (connecting factor), 130-34 (secondary characterization).
55. In general, see HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31, § 15; 1 RABEL, Op. cit. supra
note 31, at 47-60; ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at 25-58.
56. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934); GOODRIC H, op. cit. supra note
32, § 9. There are some exceptions to this generalization. Lorenzen, supra note 38, at
235, 537 discusses twvo primary ones; whenever qualifications affect tangible property,
the lex rei sitae should govern, and if the forum is interested only as a place of trial,
the courts should follow a system of qualification agreed upon by the foreign states
concerned.
57. While Robertson favors the internal law of the forum for the primary char-
acterization and connecting factor stages, he is less certain as to what system should be
employed for the secondary characterization stage. ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note 34, at
69, 110, 133. See McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 688-89, 186 So.
305, 310 (1939) which follows the determination of the law of the state enacting a
statute when it must be labeled substance or procedure. This decision is criticized in
HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31, § 52.
58. See Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REv. 447, 450
(1953), who states that except for some constitutional limitation, the courts are free to
use the characterization device to avoid standard rules.
59. "In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress has not pre-
scribed, where the policy of one state statute comes into conflict with that of another,
the necessity of some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the two states is
still more apparent."
"[T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and
credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those
of the other, but by appraising the governmental interest of each jurisdiction, and turn-
ing the scale of decision according to their weight." Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n., 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). See also Watson v. Employers Lia-
bility Assurance Corp., 23 U.S.L. Week 4045, 4047 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1954).
60. For example, federal legislation in the anti-trust field defines a national policy.
For an alternative solution to conflicts problems in this area, see Note, 30 IND. L.J.
502 (1955).
61. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
CoLum. L. Rzv. 1, 28 (1945). Mr. Justice Jackson presents a brilliant analysis of the
theory and current problems of choice-of-law in the Supreme Court.
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"There are no judicial stanldards of valuation of such imponderables. ' '6 2
It is manifest that the application of conflicts rules has not provided
consistency among the states in determining when the direct action
statute applies.63 As a consequence, a state following rigid conflicts
rules in determining its applicability may have its policies thwarted,
while other states interpret the rules to advance their own statutes.6" To
prevent the infusion of these contrary legislative policies of sister states,
with the concurrent frustration of its own policies, a state should pro-
mote its domestic statutes as far as the Constitution allows.6" In de-
termining the extent permitted, the cases distinguish between situations
in which the forum has no interest in the suit and those in which such
an interest exists. The latter situation will be first considered. In
determining the outlines of what constitutes a substantial interest or
minimum contact to justify a forum's application of its own law, the
due process and full faith and credit clauses suggest a similarity in their
62. Ibid.
63. Note, 3 UTAn L. REv. 490, 503 (1953). It has been argued that a multi-state
situation can seldom be settled by the application of general choice of law rules. Han-
cock, su~pra note 33, at 147.
64. Assume state A has a direct action statute and state B has a conventional
statute which requires a judgment first against the tortfeasor. Assume that in one case,
the insurance contract is made in state A. A suit on it is brought in state B, which
classifies the direct action statute on substantive and, consequently, permits a direct suit
against the insurer. But assume the facts are reversed. The contract is made in state B,
and the suit is brought in state A. State A perhaps calls its statute procedural, and
therefore, is entitled to apply it to the case. Thus, in both situations, the direct action
statute may be applied. The converse of this may also result.
There is no reason why states with less rigid standards should apply the rigid law
unless uniformity is to be worshipped. Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in
the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv. 4, 30 (1944).
65. While no author seems to go this far, many have suggested modifications on
rigid conflict rules. For example, see Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws:
Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE 1155, 1159 (1947), who
feels the basic goal of uniformity must be balanced with the desirability of latitude for
states with divergent ideas to establish their own standards of domestic behavior.
An impressive group of authorities emphasizes the significance of social and eco-
nomic factors in favor of arbitrary conflicts rules. Generally, see CooK, op. cit. supra
note 38; HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law
Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933) ; Heilman, sitpra note 31; Lorenzen, Territorial-
ity, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924) ; Yntema, The
Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928). See Comment,
44 YALE L.J. 1233 (1935).
For a concise discussion of the trend of Supreme Court decisions founded on
socio-economic considerations, see Beale, Social Justice aud Business Costs-A Study in
the Legal History of Today, 49 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1936).
One author reasons that since states have been left with almost unlimited legislative
power, they cannot be expected to dispense with such protection in the face of different
legislative policies of sister states. See NUSSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 35, at 123.
For expression of varying language which can be used to push this interest, see
note 36 supra.
NOTES
underlying requirements.66 Originally, to secure uniformity in conflicts
rules, the Court emphasized the importance of determining where the
contract was made or to be performed.6 7 More recently, a governmental
interest test of reasonableness and fairness, based upon examination of
the circumstances of the case, has been adopted.6" This line of decisions
minimizes the conceptualistic approach and recognizes the substantiality
of other interests.69
Contacts relating to the making and performance of contracts have
always been sufficient to justify application of a tate's relevant statutory
policies, even though it was not the forum and interests of other states
were asserted."0 In workmen's compensation cases the place where the
accident occurred has also been considered a sufficient interest.7 Several
theories support choice of law: vested rights, reasonabld expectations,
governmental consideration of social policy, and naturalness in place of
66. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
For general discussion of the two clauses and their relation to the conflict of laws, see
CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 15-20 (1942);
Dodd, Jr., The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of
Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv. 533 (1926) ; Hilpert and Cooley, The Federal Con-
stitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 27 (1939) ; Moore and Oglebay, The
Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA. L. REV. 557 (1943) ; Overton, State
Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Due-
Process Clause, 22 ORE. L. REv. 109 (1943).
"It seems apparent that those factors which, by their presence in the case of a
foreign statute, impel its application under the full faith and credit clause are similar
to those which by their absence in the case of a statute of the forum, prohibit its ap-
plication as a matter of due process." Hilpert and Cooley, supra at 39; also see CARNA-
HAN, op. cit. supra, § 20.
67. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924); Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N.Y. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357
(1918); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897). See Greene, The Allgeyer Case as a Constitutional Embrasure of
Territoriality, 2 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 22 (1927).
68. The dissent of J. Brandeis in N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 377
(1918) was apparently the first advocation of the governmental interest test. He
attacked the conceptualistic philosophy and maintained that extra-state contracts could
be affected if within a reasonable scope of regulation. He applied this test in Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), but it was held that the forum state had an
insufficient interest in the suit to justify application of its own statute.
For examples of more recent use of the test, see Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,
318 U.S. 313 (1943); Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 294 U.S. 143 (1934).
69. See CARNAHAN, op. cit. sapra note 66, § 20; Cheatham, supra note 66, at 594-
600; Moore and Oglebay, supra note 66.
70. See note 67 supra.
71. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939) ; but cf. Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 "(1932). See
also STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 31, at 219.
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redress for the injury." The place of accident theory was extended
recently to insurance regulation when the Supreme C6urt of the United
States upheld Louisiana's direct action statute and permitted suit by a
citizen of Louisiana, injured in that state, against an insurance company
on a contract made outside the state." Language in the decision empha-
sized the sociological association with the place of accident in order to
justify it as a contact; the Court stressed the fact that Louisiana may be
required to care for the injured parties.74
As a contact point, place of injury is certainly as justifiable as place
of making or performing of the contract, although the exclusive use of
the latter contacts might conceivably provide a uniform system for re-
solving multi-state insurance conflicts. 75  Any scheme for regulating
insurance must be examined in view of the competing interests to be
protected. One purpose of liability insurance is the protection of injured
parties. 76  Frequently, these parties will have no relation to the state in
which the contract was made, yet regulations of these states will ulti-
mately affect the injured's rights. Since the state where the accident
occurred does have some interest in the injured party, it seems just as
reasonable to permit the law of this state to determine the rights of the
injured person as the law of the state in which the contract was made.7
72. For general discussion of these theories and the place of tort rule in relation
to conflicts cases, see 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1287-1304 (1935) ; GOODRICH,
op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 92-105; HANCOCK, op. cit. spra note 31 ; 2 RABEL, op. cit. supra
note 31, at 227-354; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 31, at 201-12; Lorenzen, Tort Liabil-
ity and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REV. 483 (1931) ; Rheinstein, supra note 64.
73. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 23 U.S.L. Week 4045 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 1954). It is significant to note that the Louisiana statute demands that before
insurance companies receive a certificate of authority to do business in the state, they
must consent to being sued by the injured person or his heirs in a direct action. LA. REv.
STAT. § 983 E (1951). The dissent in the Watson case would have based the decision on
this consent theory, but the majority decided the case on the constitutional question of the
validity of this statute to effect extraterritorially made contracts. While apparently
this consent requirement is valid, see discussion raising opposite possibility in Com-
ment, 5 STAN. L. REV. 514 (1953). For general analysis of the limitations of constitu-
tional conditions imposed by states, see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitu-
tional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935) ; Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77
U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929).
74. 23 U.S.L. WEEK 4045, 4047 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1954). The court reasoned that
Louisiana had a natural interest in protecting people injured within the state because
many of them would be citizens or would have to be cared for in the state. This care
must come from hospitals of the state or even from the public.
75. However, for a criticism of the place of tort rule, see STU.IBERG, op. cit. supra
31, at 201-12.
76. See Leigh, Direct Actions Against Liability Insurers, 1949 INs. L.J. 633.
77. It might be contended that a state regulating insurance contracts made within
its borders has a stronger relation than does a state protecting the injured. However,
people injured within a state are generally its citizens. It is probable that the number
of people injured in a state is comprised of as large a percentage of citizens of the
state as is the group making contracts within the state. It might be reasoned that when
an out of state citizen seeks to capitalize on the regulations of a state in the face of
NOTES
The objection to place of accident as a contact and to the encourage-
ment of a state to promote its own domestic policy is the opportunity of
injured parties to select a forum with a statute favorable to them.
Formerly, the insurance company could, by making its contracts in a
state with lenient insurance regulations, have a decisive advantage in
determining the outcome of litigation. Now the use of place of accident
as an equally legitimate contact reverses the advantage.9 Whether the
Court will approve still other types of contacts in the insurance area, as
it has tended to do in workmen's compensation, remains to be seen."° In
any event, whenever it can find a constitutionally substantial contact, the
state should openly admit an intention to further its own domestic policy
and apply its own statute. The process of characterization should be
eliminated under these circumstances. 8
Whenever the state does not possess a substantial interest, com-
pletely different problems arise. Subject to the full faith and credit
clause, the forum may refuse to entertain the suit. 2 Or it may accept
the case but refuse to recognize a defense based on a foreign statute.8"
regulations directly associated with a resident, the latter should prevail. However, the
need for generally applicable law would outweigh a desire to detail this limited number
of exceptions.
78. It has been asserted that this practice is not objectionable. See Rheinstein,
supra note 64, at 30. This practice is possible in workmen's compensation litigation. See
NussBAuMI, op. cit. supra note 35, at 59-63; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra note 31, at 219.
79. This advantage is reversed only when an injured party can utilize the Louisiana
direct action statute. Of course, even when no such statute exists, an injured party has
some opportunity to seek a forum whose rules favor a statute partial to the plaintiff.
80. There is a practical justification when a state applies its own law in workmen's
compensation cases. Workmen's compensation awards are made by a commission em-
powered to apply only the laws of the state of its creation. However, there is no such
restriction on the courts in resolving insurance problems, and the use of a foreign state's
law is possible. This difference has not been emphasized by the courts.
To date, workmen's compensation cases have placed emphasis on tort, contract,
business localization, and employment location. See STUMIBERG, op. cit. supra note 31,
at 212-23; Wellen, Workime's Compensation, Conflict of Laws and the Constitution,
55 W. VA. L.Q. 131, 137-42 (1952).
The cases in the two areas have given consideration to sociological factors to jus-
tify the substantiality of contact. Compare Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 542 (1935), with Watson v. Employers Liability As-
surance Corp., 23 U.S.L. Week 4045, 4047 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1954). See Note, 35 COLUm.
L. Rzv. 751 (1935). The Court has accepted the relationship of the state to an in-
dividual requiring economic assistance, though not necessarily a citizen. From this,
perhaps, may be inferred the possibility of the state recognizing residency, domiciliary
status, or place of incorporation as sufficient connection to impose its own statutes in
a multi-state suit.
81. The purpose of characterization is merely to provide a system for reaching
a fair and adequate result. There is no constitutional or statutory compulsion for its
use, however. In view of the consequences of resorting to this process, it seems that
better results may be obtained when the court is unrestricted by the demands of
characterization.
82. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
83. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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The latter alternative is severely limited by the due process clause."4 A
state may be reluctant to apply a foreign statute because of inconvenience
to the court85 or repugnancy to its public policy."6 However, unless the
policy of the forum is violently opposed to such a statute, recent cases
indicate that the Supreme Court will require recognition of causes of
action based on a foreign state's statute.8 7
In accepting the case, a disinterested forum should retain the process
of characterization. Since a substantial interest is necessary before a
forum can justify application of its own substantive law, the abandon-
ment of this process would' offer no advantages. However, in using this
process, a state might attempt to classify the foreign statute as procedural
in order to apply its own law. Whether this would be considered to be a
discriminating determination and consequently disallowed by the Supreme
Court remains unsettled.8 8 The Court has upheld a state's right to clas-
sify a statute as procedural even to the extent of frustrating the objec-
tive of uniformily enforcing foreign causes of action." It has condoned
a state's refusal to decide a cause of action when the statute of limita-
tions of the forum was violated even though the statute of limitations
84. One court has stated that ". . . to refuse to give effect to a substantive de-
fense, arising under a contract valid where made and to be performed, would violate the
principles of due process, even though the local courts might lawfully refuse to af-
firmatively enforce the contract." Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp.
145, 147 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
85. See Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373
(1904) ; cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946). Generally see Blair, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUAr. L. REV. 1
(1929).
86. See discussion in GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 32, § 11; STUMBERG, op. Cit.
supra note 31, at 168-72. For opposition to the extension of this principle, see Good-
rich, supra note 32, at 156. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REV.
26 (1938) ; Jackson, supra note 61, at 26; Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public
Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REV. 196 (1934).
87. First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
See Leflar, supra note 58; Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 203 (1952). Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951). See Comments, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 441 (1952) ; 51 MICH. L. REv. 267
(1953).
One state court has refused to entertain a suit based on a cause of action arising
in a state with a direct action statute but brought in a state where no such statute
existed. The refusal was based on public policy reasoning. Lieberthal v. Glens Falls
Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946). One reputable writer argues that
this attitude in regard to the direct action statute would be embraced by the majority
of states in the absence of a direct action statute. The writer concedes that if a policy
covering all injuries is issued in a state with a direct action statute, thenth statute should
be applicable to local injuries even though the forum has no such statute. STUMIBERG,
op. cit. supra note 31, at 211, n.92; contra, Note( 29 N. DAN. L. REV. 182, 184 (1953).
88. An assertion by the forum that a particular aspect of a case is procedural is
not conclusive. See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
See also 27 COLUm. L. REV. 485 (1937).
89. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). See Comment, 33
B.U.L. REV. 508 (1953) ; Note, 27 TE.%P. L.Q. 216 (1953).
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of the state in which the action arose had not yet run. The wisdom of
applying this precedent to the direct action statute is questionable. Ad-
mittedly, rules determining parties to a suit are generally classified as
procedural." But a statute should be thoroughly evaluated before la-
beled.91 As has been pointed out, the direct action statute confers on the
injured party many benefits which may well make the difference between
a favorable and unfavorable verdict, a substantial or average verdict, or
even the existence or non-existence of a cause of action.92  The pro-
cedural machinery of the forum is not handicapped in applying this
statute.93 It would seem that the statute should be classified as sub-
stantive.94  Also, there should be consistency in characterization. Sup-
pose the forum classifies an insurance suit as contract and applies the
law of the state in which the contract was made, which perhaps has
no direct action statute. In a succeeding suit, it ought to classify a
comparable fact situation as contract, even if that state does have such
a statute.
The direct action statute is but one aspect of complex experimenta-
tion in insurance and accident regulation undertaken by the states.95
While some state plans, such as financial responsibility laws, have been
adopted generally, many diverse policies still exist;96 when competing
interests of several states are involved in litigation, a great deal of con-
fusion and inconsistency persists.
90. GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 32, § 82; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 558
(1934).
91. HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31, § 13. For general discussion of problems in-
volved in labeling a statute substance or procedure, see authorities cited in note 53 supra.
92. If an accident occurred in Louisiana between husband and wife, a suit under
the direct action statute would be permissible. See note 17 supra. If the identical
parties had the accident in a state without such a statute, there would be no cause of
action. See discussion of this point in Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209
La. 495, 24 So.2d 875 (1946). But see Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d
597 (1936) where accident occurred in state allowing interspousal suits. When suit was
brought in a state which prohibited such suits, the case was dismissed.
93. Such a handicap would clearly justify classification of the statute as pro-
cedural, for a forum is not required to make over its machinery for the administration
of justice. See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 32, § 80; Cheatham and Reese, Choice of
the Applicable Law, 52 CoLuMr. L. REv. 959, 964-65 (1952).
94. "But it is impossible to see how the Louisiana statute could be classified as a
rule of procedure for conflict of laws purposes. Such a classification should only be
made where the rule in question cannot be conveniently implemented by the court of
the forum. If this element of inconvenience is not present, there is no sufficient jus-
tification for disregarding the choice-of-law policies which require that rights vested
under a proper law should be enforced, so far as is possible, in all other jurisdictions."
HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 31, § 52. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
95. In support of state regulation of insurance, see Orfield, Improving State Regu-
lation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. REv. 219 (1948); Patterson, The Future of State
Supervision of Insurantce, 23 TEx. L. Rv. 18 (1944).
96. Marryott, supra note 31, at 85.
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Though federal control would eliminate this inconsistency, it would
be discordant with the current policy of avoiding all insurance regula-
tion." The price of entering the field completely, abandoning state ex-
perimentation, would be high."8 It might be suggested that when state
interests clash, the Supreme Court should weigh the conflicting policies
and select the most desirable one. This procedure, however, would ap-
pear to be burdensome. The Court has been content to define general
boundaries of extraterritorial application of state statutes.
Since conflicts rules have failed to achieve their purpose of uni-
formity and consistency of decision in regard to the direct action statute,
one state is able to infringe on the sphere of interest of others. A more
rational approach would be the abandonment of conflicts rules; and when
it has a substantial interest, a state should be encouraged to apply its own
law to the extent permitted by the Constitution.
SECURITY INVENTIONS: COMPENSATION UNDER PATENT
AND ATOMIC ENERGY ACTS
Increasing numbers of inventions are being denied patent grants as
a result of the conflict between the incompatible concepts of secrecy, a
vital factor in national security, and full disclosure, a basic element of
the patent system. National defense has increased the interest of
Government in the field of research; consequently, the regulation of
patent rights affects a considerable part of current technological develop-
ments.1 In an attempt to replace the incentive stultified by this regula-
tion, the Government compensates the affected inventors. 2  From the
97. For discussions of federal control possibilities, see KULP, CASUALTY INSUR-
ANCE 655-59 (2d. ed. 1942) ; Hubbard, Too Many Governments, 10 A.B.A.J. 207 (1924).
Of course, an alternative to direct federal regulation of insurance is the enactment
of a federal system of conflicts rules. This would permit prediction in interstate cases,
and prevent harmful results of state provincialism. Some feel that it may be premature
to sacrifice state independence and diversity in the area of conflict of laws. See
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 587-88 (1953).
98. One obvious danger is that congressional legislation would fail to set standards
for nationwide operation as high as that currently supported by the individual states.
Patterson, supra note 95, at 31. A second obvious objection is the possible destruction
or diminution of state power, with the consequent weakening of local government.
1. The majority of inventions pertinent to military secrecy problems are subject to
government control because of the participation by the government in their development
and creation. The following discussion does not attempt to deal with the regulation of
inventions in which the Government has an interest. For an analysis of this aspect see
Dienner, Government Policies Relating to Research and Patents, 13 LAW & CONTEMIP.
PROB. 320 (1948) ; Forman, Government Ownership of Patents and the Administration
Thereof, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 31 (1954).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1952).
